Tag Archives: Connectivity

September 14, 2010 · 3:25 pm

eEnabled Aircraft So Whats the Difference

An eEnabled aircraft is an aircraft that has one or more IT networks on board and requires a connection to a ground based network for its operation.

Both the A380 and B787 are classed as eEnabled aircraft and their respective airframers have heralded that eEnabled aircraft will provide opportunities for airlines to operate aircraft more effectively.

For this to become a reality, the main airline challenge is the successful uploading/downloading of aircraft information. This has to be carried out securely and with the confidence that information will be delivered without any external interference.

Consider the diagram’s below, traditionally aircraft security was contained physically on board with no major external interfaces. With the introduction of eEnabled aircraft, you can see this has opened up multiple channel’s of communications with several external IT networks, each having their own independent IT security.

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IT Security and infrastructure are key to the successful operation of these new aircraft and for the first time, the regulatory meaning of  ‘Airworthiness’ now includes the IT networks involved in the servicing of the aircraft.

Assume one of these eEnabled channels had been proven to be weak. Potentially, because IT Security is only as strong as its weakest link, we could assume all communication channels had been compromised.

Airframers have put a lot of effort considering these types of scenarios and provde tools to protect the aircraft.  Airlines however have to consider not just the successful operation of new eEnabled aircraft but the wider protection of their existing IT network operations.

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August 25, 2010 · 3:23 pm

Did A Software Virus Contribute To Fatal Air Crash

Preliminary investigation into the 2008 crash of Spanair Flight 5022, released in August 2009 by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, states that the probable cause of the crash was the flight crew’s failure to ensure that the plane’s flaps and slats were extended for takeoff.

Its early days to be sure but from what is leaking out in the media ( Spanish newspaper El Pais) it being reported that malware may have been a contributed to the accident.

An internal Spanair report indicated that a central computer system used to monitor aircraft problems had been infected with malware, according to El Pais. The infected computer system, located at the airline’s HQ in Palma de Mallorca, failed to detect several technical problems with the airplane.

In a previous article ‘A Case For Aircraft Security’ I emphasised the importance of IT Security in the operation of modern aircraft. If the final investigation due later this year in December confirms that a trojan was a contributor to the accident it will draw attention to the more advanced software systems being used in the operation of the Boeing 787 and Airbus A380.

When it comes to ‘IT/Aircraft Security’ airlines are ultimately responsible and this event will have airlines around the world re-evaluating their operational processes. For those airlines flying or have orders for the B787 or A380 they must focus on this tragic event, even if malware took little or no part in the accident the fact that it is being considered, highlights what is possible as aircraft evolve into mobile ‘IT networks’.

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January 27, 2010 · 3:26 pm

A Case For Aircraft Security

Comments on Runway Girls Blog on the subject of  ‘Connectivity crossover and the case for cockpit security’ do highlight an interesting debate on the subject of security for the new generation or eEnabled aircraft.

This is not the first discussion on the subject, as since the FAA Special Conditions No. 25-356-SC and 25-357-SC were published in Jan 08 a number of interesting debates have been triggered.

I don’t profess to have any answers but I have observed the many issues in this area for a number of years, here are some of my personal opinions.

With major airlines worldwide investing in a variety of IFE and connectivity solutions, keeping an ever-increasing techno aware passenger informed and entertained, is an important requirement for operators.

Retro- fitting of new IFE systems has been carried out successfully for many years … todays newer IFE systems are introducing for the first time TCP/IP networks as an integral part of the aircraft and for airlines this introduces a new set of security risks and challenges.

With the successful first flight of the 787 Dec last year (2009), focus has inevitably switched to the safe operation of the aircraft, particularly from an operators connectivity view-point. This is being helped by airline operators of the A380, who are now feeding back on this new connected aircraft journey, helping airlines to understand the operational challenges of eEnablement.

One of the most important new challenges of eEnablement, is the exposure of an airlines existing (in some cases substantial) ground based back office IT systems to what is essentially a hostile aircraft. eEnablement will be a risk until airline operators are satisfied they have an IT architecture in place, protecting both aircraft and ground based networks.

Companies with global business interests today issue employees with network ready devices for connecting  to back office systems from practically any worldwide location. These systems consider each other as hostile until authentication has been successfully accepted by devices.

eEnabled aircraft have very similar requirements, with one major exception, some of the devices onboard the aircraft could never be and would never be trusted (Nintendo DS, iPhone, Blackberry’s, Laptop etc), yet they have potential to connect to the operators onboard networks via WiFi, USB, RJ-45 etc.

Airframers are aware of connectivity issues and have solutions to help control the different connectivity options on board and both would rightly point out that ultimately, security, is the operators responsibility.

It is accepted in the wider aviation industry that individual(s) exist who have subversive agendas. These individuals (see diag) could be onboard the aircraft, at the airport, in fact, practically any location globally.

Will the aircraft become a target for attack, absolutely, from day one, the challenge exists and security solutions will be tested.

Should the passenger IFE domain be isolated from other domains onboard eEnabled aircraft … my personal view is that they should be, this would simplify and help minimise the overall risk.

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